

Taking control over the commercial determinants of NCDs

Strengthening the persuading power of health in multi-sectoral governance

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NCD crisis of the Pacific fueled by the commercial determinants of health

A rapid rise in the premature deaths caused by non-communicable diseases (NCDs) marks the global burden of disease. 70% of all deaths around the world happen because of NCDs, and the quickest increase is happening in low- and low-middle income economies, where an astounding 13-14% growth in mortality due to NCDs was shown between 2000 and 2015 (1). In the Western Pacific Region this rate is even worse than the global trends: in 2016 86% of total deaths in this region occurred due to NCDs, compared to the rate of 79% in 2000. Cardiovascular diseases cause 46% of these deaths, while cancer and respiratory diseases add up to 36% in 2016 (2). In the first eight places of countries with the highest diabetes prevalence in the world six are occupied by Pacific Island Countries (PICs) (3). Some PICs are among the countries with the highest prevalence of tobacco use and obesity globally (4,5). 54% of deaths caused by NCDs in PICs¹ are premature deaths.

The burden of disease caused by NCDs does not only places health systems under considerable strain; the socioeconomic costs of morbidity, resulting disability and premature mortality add up through the loss in productivity to poverty, hinder development, and widen inequalities. The rise of NCDs is a significant threat to fulfilling the UN Sustainable Development Goals all over the world – both in developed and developing countries (6).

“The NCD epidemic is driven by poverty, globalization of marketing and trade of health-harming products, rapid urbanization, and population growth” (7). Moodie (8) calls NCDs profit-driven diseases: “Through the sale and promotion of tobacco, alcohol, and ultra-processed food and drinks, transnational corporations are major drivers of global epidemics of NCDs.” The term commercial determinants of health has emerged in the literature to name “the strategies and approaches used by the private sector to promote products and choices that are detrimental for health” (9). Commercial influence on population health comes from two directions: the literature describes the ways trade and investment liberalization has been contributing to the rise of NCDs (10–16) and gives an account on the various market and non-

¹ The WHO Health Observatory Database provides data on this indicator from only 8 of the 22 PICs: Fiji, Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.

market activities unhealthy commodity corporations have been deploying to build demand, supply and supportive policy environment for their products (8,17–23).

The Pacific Region is especially susceptible for commercial influence. Its colonial history has placed these economies dependent upon external trade and development aid; both which makes it difficult to fend off pressure to liberalize their trade and allow the imports of unhealthy commodities. The weak bureaucratic system of these countries arising from their smallness and low-income economy make them easy targets for commercial influence, aggravating the negative impact of trade and investment liberalization. Studies show that the rapid rise of NCDs in the Pacific are in strong correlation with trade and investment liberalization (24–35). While PICs are excellent examples of how trade and investment liberalization and unhealthy commodity corporations fuel the NCD crises, we know little about the ways these countries govern the commercial determinants of NCDs. There is an urgent need to understand how commercial influence can be tackled if we want to rein in the global NCD epidemic; the example of PICs can be useful not only to other small island developing states but to any other countries struggling with government fragmentation, regulatory capture or constrained regulatory space due to vested interests. Thus, this research aims to fill this gap by improving the understanding of how the commercial determinants of NCDs can be better governed in PICs.

Tobacco kills more people than any other unhealthy commodity (6), thus the attention on tobacco companies has been in the forefront among the unhealthy commodity industries. The establishment of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control is the first global treaty focusing on an aspect of commercial determinants of NCDs (36), and it is considered to be a great achievement for governance for health. While the regulation of alcohol and unhealthy foods are more complex, as people need to eat and the harmful effects of alcohol consumed in small quantity is debated opposed to tobacco which has no safe use limit (37), the majority of global health experts believe that these unhealthy commodities should be regulated with a similar approach, because these industries have been applying similar strategies to the tobacco industry in their efforts of maximizing their profits (17,38). Therefore, to understand how the commercial determinants of NCDs can be better governed in the Pacific, this research used tobacco governance as its case study.

Taking control over the commercial determinants of NCDs – the case of tobacco in Fiji and Vanuatu

In order to collect in-depth and accurate data to understand the ways health lobby managed to persuade the non-health government departments to control the commercial determinants of NCDs, this research employed a qualitative methodology, seeking to understand governance mechanisms in two purposively selected PICs. The applied methods involved literature review, in-depth interviews and document analysis. Fiji and Vanuatu were selected as case study countries, based on their high performance in tobacco control according to the MPOWER indicators (39) (indicating that the country is doing a good job in tobacco control), their high smoking prevalence (indicating that smoking is or was actually a problem), and their relatively large population size in the Pacific region. More than 65 representatives of government bodies, civil organizations, and development partners were interviewed. The document analysis involved openly accessible tobacco control national policy and legal documents, reports of Fiji and Vanuatu. The analysis on the collected data is still under progress, therefore this paper aims to

introduce the literature on the ways the commercial determinants of health impacts on the rise of NCDs and highlight some of the preliminary findings.

Where does the commercial influence come from?

The literature identifies two sources of commercial influence in particular relation to NCDs. The first source, trade and investment agreements increase the availability and affordability of unhealthy commodities (a) by lifting tariff and non-tariff barriers of unhealthy commodities, and (b) by the facilitation of services and investment; and (c) by shrinking domestic policy space and governance. Labonte (10) adds a fourth to this list: by increasing economic insecurity. Furthermore, strong intellectual property protection as part of the investment liberalization principles constrains access to treatments of NCDs (40–42).

Unhealthy commodity industries are the second source of commercial influence on health. The role transnational corporations play in fueling trade and investment liberalization has been documented by multiple authors (43), and the "influence of tobacco, alcohol and food companies in globalizing risk factors associated with NCDs is at risk being over-analyzed" (25). Unhealthy commodity industries operate with larger budgets than entire countries, thus they have formidable economic power in their hand to create demand and market for their products and to influence domestic and global policy makers (37,44,45).

These commercial influences directly challenge governments in three ways: by fragmenting governments, inducing regulatory capture, and constraining regulatory space (8,10,11,17,18,21,43,46–54). Without addressing these issues, governments are likely to become helpless in tackling the commercial determinants of NCDs.

Strategies to tackle the commercial determinants of NCDs in Fiji and Vanuatu

The literature review has shown that the scholarship on unhealthy commodity industries, trade and investment liberalization and health is wide and is growing in relation to the Pacific. Governance scholars address the issue of regulatory capture, and there is a slowly growing amount of literature on how the policy incoherence and government fragmentation over the interests of trade, economy or agriculture and health should be tackled. Most of the global governance for health literature suggest institutionalist reforms to control commercial influence, while the development literature argues that in developing countries and in the Pacific such reforms are rarely successful. The literature explaining the ways PICs govern the commercial determinants of NCDs is little, and it could not explain how these small island developing countries face the political economy underlying the NCD epidemic.

The data collected in Fiji and Vanuatu was aimed to fill this gap. When interviewees recounted the strategies behind the success stories when they managed to persuade non-health government bodies to pursue policies aligned with public health interests, they highlighted the importance of four approaches.

Firstly, the demonstration of the socio-economic costs of NCDs has proven to be an effective way to persuade non-health government departments to engage into the regulation of unhealthy commodities.

Secondly, exerting political pressure from two directions simultaneously forces politicians and high level government officials to respond to the problem. International pressure can be applied in the form of

global or regional frameworks, standards and forums. By engaging the public, the media and the civil society organizations a bottom-up pressure can be created. The way the issue is framed is crucial in moving both the public and the politicians.

Thirdly, increasing cooperation among various actors from different sectors and political affiliation, involving NGOs, faith-based organizations, development partners and private actors can magnify the influence of the health lobby. The coordinated action of a large and multi-faceted constituency can accumulate surprising amount of power to elevate the voice of health.

Finally, it is important to understand where the access points are to influence policy-planning, decision-making and legislative processes. In most countries the procedures of the government and the parliament allow the public, NGOs, development organizations and private actors to express their opinion and suggestions. Often these access points are not known or not used by these actors, yet a careful strategy can have good chance to influence governance this way.

Conclusions

The preliminary results arising from the collected data in Fiji and Vanuatu show that some of the recommendations of the literature can be applied in the context of PICs. Many officers within government bodies, civil organizations and development partners who consider themselves actors of the health lobby are mindful of the importance of representing health interests in multisectoral policy making. They are also aware of the recommended strategies, the institutional frameworks are often in place, and they share success stories when the commercial determinants of NCDs were reined in through their concerted actions. However, the data also shows that there are many cases when no considerable action is taken to elevate the voice of health in multisectoral policy making, even though the pathways to step up are open. It is crucial to understand the reasons behind this inactivity as it allows us to understand the hidden barriers of raising the power of health in governance. By the time the analysis of the collected data is completed, hopefully this research will be able to provide an explanation of these underlying factors.

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